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Forward 
Abstract 
What started off as a question on the possibly of data transmission via sound above the 
level of human hearing evolved into a project exploring the possibility of ultrasonic data 
infiltration and exfiltration in an information security context. It is well known that sound can be 
used to transmit data as this can be seen in many old technologies, most notably and simply 
DTMF tones for phone networks. But what if the sound used to transmit signals was in in the 
ultrasonic range? It would go generally unnoticed to anyone not looking for it with tools such as 
a spectrum analyzer. This could provide an unnoticed means of transmitting overhead data 
without the use of radio signals or physical connections, or, more clandestinely, a means to inject 
or retrieve data virtually undetected for espionage, control, or other malicious activity. As 
expected, there would obviously be issues with signal quality as the open air is heavy with 
environmental interference, but in specific cases as seen in the following research, a discrete 
sonic means of data transmission may not only be practical, but necessary for the task at hand.  
 This project is an exploration of the practicality of ultrasonic data transmission between 
computers. It will include research into the topic in general from scientific, technological, and 
security perspectives. There will be inclusions from other research projects as well as practical 
applications already in existence. Interestingly, there are already some suspected, but 
unconfirmed planned systems as well security incidents using this technology. Finally, a short 
series of semi-formal (in a scientific sense) experiments conducted to provide firsthand accounts 
and results of the ultrasonic data transmission concept. 
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Joint Project Statement 
 This project was a joint effort between myself, Alex Edwards, and Hunter Young. We are 
both seniors in Kennesaw State University’s Bachelor of Information Security and Assurance 
program. This became a mutual idea with collaborative research occurring on a regular basis. 
With academic approval, we moved forward with the formal project. Out of many reasons, the 
need for pooling of resources and ideas provided the necessity for a joint project. The 
experiments we conducted often needed multiple computers and at least two people across a 
distance. 
 While most of our data and sources of research will be identical, these reports are 
individual efforts with the last step of collaboration being a shared dump of experiment results 
and ideas about the subject. Hunter and I have similar experience with information security and 
information technology in general with myself having amateur radio and more professional IT 
experience and Hunter having more experience in music and acoustics. This provides a unique 
opportunity to produce two conclusions, each of a slightly different perspective and background, 
from similar data. There will be intentionally concurrent sections, and correlations beyond 
experimentation and joint research could be considered a blind consensus between Hunter and I. 
Initial Theory 
While the concept of ultrasonic data transmission can cover a wide range of practical uses, 
steganography is of pinnacle interest to those in the information security field. By nature, 
transmitting anything by ultrasound can be considered steganography as the data is publicly “in 
the air” but is hidden by anyone not looking for it. Further, because the ultrasound would be a 
significantly higher frequency than most noise or music, it may be able to better pierce through 
interference and could be played with music or imbedded into music files.  
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For cyber security, the ability to discretely remove data or carry a malicious payload in 
the form of sound presents many opportunities and threats. This theory is amplified by the fact 
that, while network cables can be unplugged and WiFi radios turned off, most modern computers, 
especially consumer laptops and phones, have built in microphones and speakers that can be 
utilized maliciously to compromise or control those compromised systems.  
As initial research was conducted, keeping other ideas in mind, “Can this be used to 
deploy or control malware and how hard is it to stop that?” became the most pressing theoretical 
question regarding cyber security practicality. What we found reported on the internet and what 
we were able to accomplish in our experiments proved interesting. 
Executive Summary 
 This report will start with a basic explanation of the science behind sound in a physical 
sense, and then the practice of modulating waves to carry information. Human hearing’s limits 
and the limitations imposed by the properties of ultrasound itself will be discussed. Technology, 
including both audio equipment and audio software will be discussed also. Finally, information 
security in general, as well as networking, steganography, and data infiltration/exfiltration will 
be covered. These first three major sections will provide a background for our investigations. 
This report assumes a basic grasp of these concepts already. Some terms will be explained inline 
where relevant to the topic at hand. 
 As expected, there were very few sources to comment on as ultrasonic data transmission 
and steganography, at least in the use case presented here. However, a potential security and 
commercial incidence were discovered as well as several short reports discussing specific tests in 
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depth. The first case from Fraunhofer FKIE, was the closest match to our own theory and 
investigations. 
 While the tests were narrowed down from earlier plans to meet realistic and in-scope 
goals, the overall creation of a proof of concept was successful and yielded useful results toward 
practical conclusions in close concurrence to our research, but also with some interesting 
variances. Finally, after conclusions are presented, keeping with the theme of practicality, a 
discussion is included covering suggestions for applications, scenarios, and security controls. 
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Acoustics 
Sound Waves 
 As many already know, sound is transmitted by the movement of areas of matter that 
have been compressed or decompressed relative to the rest pressure of a physical medium. These 
periods of compression travel through a medium from the source in a spherical pattern (assuming 
no obstacles are present) from the source in the form of a wave. These waves may be absorbed 
by surfaced and converted into other forms of kinetic energy. Also they may be refracted upon 
the transition between mediums or reflected back toward the source or in perpendicular direction 
entirely. These concepts are important to the physical characteristics placing features and 
restrains on the ability of sound to transmit data. 
Along with light, sound is one of our oldest methods of communication principally in the 
form of speech and also with signals as with sirens or beeps and to deliver entertainment in the 
form of music. In addition to analog modes, sound is also able to represent digital data in a 
primitive form. Different frequencies and patters are used to convey messages. 
Mode and Modulation 
On a more complicated level, as with electromagnetic energy, both types of waves can 
carry more complicated signals via different modes such as AM and FM. While sound signals, 
like speech and music, are analog and arbitrary in regard to mode, digital information usually 
requires a uniform mode. This is often more apparent in electromagnetic waves in the light and 
radio spectrum. There a multitude of modes in use from the simple constant wave (CW) used for 
Morse code to amplitude modulation (AM) and frequency modulation (FM) used for analog 
music and voice. Other, more complex modes are usually combinations of theses simpler modes 
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and alternate between them in a pattern. Slower, but higher fidelity digital modes like phase shift 
keying (PSK) and frequency shift keying (PSK) are often used for long distance communication 
while faster, but more fragile, forms of modulation like quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) 
used by digital cable TV and WiFi. For our tests, we stuck to one mode, FSK. Justification for 
this will be provided in later sections. FSK changes the frequency of a wave between two 
predetermined frequencies, a mark and space frequency, to represent ones and zeroes. As you 
will see later, the speed that data travels over these methods is measured in baud, or the number 
of symbols changes per second.    
Human Hearing 
 When these soundwaves reach a human, they travel down the ear canal, impact the 
eardrum where the kinetic energy absorbed causes the eardrum to vibrate and the connected 
bones to vibrate. These bones vibrate liquid in the inner ear, which in turn vibrates small fibers 
attached to nerves. Human hearing range, frequency wise, is roughly 20Hz to 20kHz with many 
factors contributing to the shrinking of this range, most notably age and occupational damage 
(Smith). In our tests, we noticed that approximately 17.5kHz was the upper limit of human 
hearing among ourselves and other college students with the upper range causing a sense of 
irritation more than an actual perception of sound. 
 This provides two main reinforcements to why steganography can be achieved by 
transmitting data sonically above the range of human hearing. While a human would have a hard 
time interpreting a spontaneous unexpected audible signal, any strange unexplained sounds, 
especially those emanating from electronic devices would be cause for curiosity and 
investigation. Also, because humans generate sound intentionally on a regular basis for other 
humans to hear, ultrasonic signals would be in frequencies above the range of human hearing and 
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therefore would not be interfered with and could be combined with these noises for concealment 
as you will see in one of our proofs of concept.  
Limitations 
The same background sounds (environmental noise, music, speech) that can be used to 
provide distraction, concealment, or a means of steganography might also be a source of 
destructive interference that can threaten the fidelity of a data signal. Practically, the farther away 
two sounds are in frequency (including their harmonics) the less interference. Technically, there 
can be constructive and destructive interference. With destructive interference, the high pressure 
zones of two or more soundwaves are at opposite alternating or unsynchronized times, canceling 
out net changes and pressure and reducing the volume of each sound. While humans might not 
produce ultrasonic interface, machines might, especially electrical components in the devices 
that would be transmitting and receiving signals. 
Aside from background noise, the propagation ability of ultrasound may be diminished 
compared to lower frequency noise. Many factors in the medium of travel as well as objects in 
the path of the sound could affect ultrasound differently than sounds in the human hearing range. 
This could be a research study in itself, but this investigation is mostly concerned with the 
practical ramification. We performed out tests in different environments because of this. We did 
find that ultrasound, at the same volume from the same device, did not diffract outside of a 
doorway as well as other sounds did thus demonstrated the ability for ultrasonic signals to by 
physically contained to a room. 
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Technology 
Equipment and Hardware 
Because we are testing ultrasonic data transmission and steganography in an information 
security context with computers and mobile devices in particular, it is important to confine the 
scope of tests and research to the microphones and speakers already installed on the devices. 
Almost all modern computers and mobile devices, save for a few desktops and higher end 
specific purpose machines, are sold with audio devices. 
 Microphones have diaphragms that vibrate when sound waves are absorbed much like 
eardrums. Speakers work in reverse by vibrating the diaphragm to produce sound waves in the 
air.  Design varies by type of microphone or speaker, but in general they consist of a magnet and 
a coil of wire with one or the other moving. Receiving sound produces fluctuations in the 
electrical current in the coil and the wires attached, producing an electrical representation of a 
sound wave. To create sound, the process is reversed by feeding a fluctuating current into the 
speaker and moving the diaphragm. From out tests, we have discovered that these devices have 
no problem generating and detecting ultrasonic signals under 20kHz.  
Audio Sampling and Compression (Digital/Analog) 
When analog sound is converted to electricity by a microphone, it travels to some kind of 
digital to analog converter most often referred to as a “sound card” in computer. The electronic 
representation of sound is digitized by taking measurements of the amplitude at regular intervals 
in a process called “sampling.” The reverse of this process creates sound from a speaker. The 
number of measurements per second is referred to as the “sampling rate” and is typically 
44.1kHz as the default for consumer electronics. “Bit depth” is the number of digital bits used to 
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represent each sample, with 16bit being the consumer standard (Production Bytes, 2012).  Both 
of these are proportional to the fidelity of an audio signal and together make up the “bit rate” of 
an audio signal. 
When considering the ability to store ultrasonic data in audio files, especially discretely, 
digital audio has limits beyond the capability of hardware. MP3 is the most common format for 
storing audio. It is a “lossy” format meaning that to create a smaller file, the audio is 
“compressed” by removing data. The actual compression algorithm is complex, but has two 
factors that impede its ability to carry data electronically. Typically, MP3s have a much lower bit 
rate than “raw” formats like WAV. Also, MP3 was also designed to save space by removing 
audio, such as ultrasound, that is considered to not be relevantly perceivable to humans (MP3, 
2016). One of our very first tests (separate from our main experiments) consisted of trying to 
interpret an ultrasonic data signal after it was converted to MP3 and played. The signal was 
almost completely destroyed. 
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Information Security Concepts 
Information Security 
 For this project, the primary information security concern will be cyber security. This 
covers both the devices themselves and any information on them at risk. To protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of information assets, many technical and procedural security 
controls have been developed over the years to protect these electronic devices including 
firewalls, malware scanners, access control infrastructures, and encryption. Many of the typical 
vectors of attack have some kind of preventative or mitigating control.    
Networking 
Network security falls under the realm of cyber security, and since the beginning of the 
internet age, the use of networking to share information between electronic devices locally and 
across the world is ubiquitous and constant. These networking mediums are potential vectors for 
remote attackers wishing to compromise a system to gain control, acquire confidential 
information on it, or otherwise damage the information or the device itself. These devices are 
networked via some type of connection usually Ethernet, WiFi, Cellular using any number of 
protocols and infrastructures. We have long had the capability to encrypt our communication 
channels, filter unwanted connections and content, authenticate the integrity of the received and 
sent information, to isolate and control access to networks, or completely block the flow of 
information by turning the networking hardware off.   
While these attack vectors have security controls, the possibility of network data flow via 
the audio equipment on the device widens the potential attack surface into uncontrolled and 
unsecured territory. Turning off networking equipment, unplugging cables, and even removing 
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wireless LAN hardware to ensure that that there is no unauthorized data infiltration or 
exfiltration is known as an “air gap.” The physical network isolation that an air gap provides may 
be overcome by the fact that audio equipment would almost never be considered as a means of 
digital data transmission and that sound uses the air itself as a physical medium to transmit 
signals.  
Steganography 
 The most common way to prevent unauthorized access to information on a network or 
computer is encryption. With encryption, information is scrambled into a virtually unreadable 
code that requires a key to decrypt the ciphertext. However, another, more basic method, 
steganography, is also used, more often maliciously. Instead of rendering data unreadable, 
steganography hides data among seemly normal traffic or noise. This prevents reading of the 
data as it is intended to go unnoticed, unlike encryption. This is often seen in the cyber security 
world when malware files have seemingly harmless names or in the more novelty practice of 
hiding one file within another file of a different type for example.  
 While anti-malware can often prevent or mitigate the use of steganography to hide 
malicious files by scanning everything for matches to signatures of know malware or by heuristic 
analysis of the behavior of potential malware, many technical security controls are not designed 
to handle the obscurity of ultrasonic data stenography.  
 Ultrasonic signals are stenographic in nature because they are above the range of human 
hearing and can be hidden in innocent sounding audio files without degradation to fidelity. A 
seemingly harmless listener program can sit on system for years and not be detected because the 
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malicious instructions or data to be infiltrated are not stored in the program, but are received or 
transmitted in the air in real time during execution.  
Data Infiltration and Exfiltration 
Data can mean many things; here, the concern is mostly sensitive information such as 
credit card numbers, trade secrets, or intelligence adding in further compromise of a system and 
also data as commands or instructions such as scripts, codes, and prompts. Covert retrieval of or 
leakage of this sensitive data from an otherwise secure system is exfiltration. The placement of 
data for the purposes of planting a file or delivery of malicious code on a similarly assumed 
secure system is infiltration. Recently stated in the preceding sections, infiltration of a payload 
with an ultrasonic signal via an assumed secure system’s audio equipment is of particular 
concern and will be references again in a few later sections. 
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Occurrences In The Wild 
Reported Incidents 
 There are multiple internet articles, some skeptical, about a security researcher’s 
investigation of a BIOS (basically the firmware of a motherboard) based rootkit, dubbed 
“badBIOS,” that seems to be communicating between infected systems via ultrasound. The 
malware is reported to persist on the computers firmware across BIOS flashes and operating 
system reinstalls and preventing the booting from removable media like CDs and flash drives. 
The malware is reported to initially infect via USB, make a large number of minor configuration 
changes, and exchange data between infected computers. Data packet flow was detected between 
two air gapped infected computer despite being unplugged from power and having all 
networking hardware removed. The packet flow stopped after the audio hardware was removed 
(Goodin, 2013). This is assumed to be a hoax by some, as other researchers believe the ultrasonic 
signals to be artifacts from other sources and the fact the original reporter, Dragos Ruiu, does not 
provide much evidence of his ongoing investigation (Grimes, 2013). 
 The Center for Democracy and Technology recently submitted a report to the Federal 
Trade Commission regarding the privacy concerns over cross device tracking technology. 
Among these include a company called SilverPush’s use of ultrasonic beacons to synchronize 
and analyze advertisement content allowing better targeting of marketing across media.. When a 
user accesses a website or watches a commercial from a SilverPush enabled advertiser, an 
ultrasonic beacon is played. SilverPush enabled apps on phones and tablets listen for this beacon 
and report the correlations between television choices, app usage, time, and location depending 
on the beacon. They have stated that distance is a major limiting factor of this technology.  It is 
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not known if these beacons are digital data or analog markers (Center for Democracy & 
Technology, 2015), (Bansal, 2015). 
Others’ Research 
 This is a bleeding-edge concept, so research into it, especially in an information security 
context, is extremely limited.  However, some scholars and security researches have touched on 
this concept. Many possible sources of information just seemed to point back to these same 
articles offering no new information, usually, it was the study below. 
 Michael Hanspach and Michael Goetz, two researchers at Fraunhofer FKIE, produced a 
paper stating that they were able to use a proprietary network stack (set of software and 
protocols) intended for sonic communication in another project to create an ultrasonic meshnet 
between laptops with a 20 bit per second speed at a distance of up to 19.7m. They were 
successfully able to have a keylogger transmit recorded keystrokes across a meshnet of 
computers and collect the keystrokes of the primary victim computer on remote system 
(Hanspach & Goetz, 2014). This confirms the validity of the concern that ultrasonic data 
transmission between systems is a security threat. 
 Other researchers at University of Oklahoma were able to achieve ultrasonic data 
transmission via FSK with a bit rate of up to 800 bits per second. However, their experiment was 
slightly different. They were testing the feasibility of transmitting data across solid metal 
mediums that would otherwise block radio signals. They used ultrasonic transducers (similar to 
speakers) to transmit data along steel beams (Multi-Tone FSK for Ultrasonic Communication, 
2015). This is an interesting concept because high security organizations do employ controls that 
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prevent radio signals from propagating into or out of the building. However, it does not employ 
stock hardware that normal consumer electronics would use. 
 Wentao Jiang published an article at University College Cork, Ireland providing a few 
possible theoretical uses for ultrasonic data transmission. Most of his scenarios were for 
applications where data had to be transmitted, but where radio transmission would be harmful or 
dangerous to people or other equipment, but also suggested the possibility that it could be used to 
make a more secure wireless network as ultrasound is more easily contained to a room than radio 
waves (Jiang, 2014).  
 A developer named Katee wrote a fledgling chat program called “Quietnet” that sends 
ASCII symbols to other computers at around 19kHz and is intended as a way to discretely chat 
locally without exposing the text to interception by a packet sniffer. The developer states that 
Minimodem and GNU Radio, software we use for our tests, are much better than her software 
though (Katee, 2014). 
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Testing 
Hypothesis 
 Building on the Initial Theory section, it was important to reduce our testing ideas to fit 
our constraints. Our tests, and therefore our hypothesis, had to be broken into stages. Overall, 
based on the research and our knowledge of the underlying science, successful creation a proof 
of concept seemed achievable. The inability to compress ultrasound; ability to transmit ultrasonic 
data over a distance; the ability to receive, demodulate and parse that data; and the ability to use 
music as a means of delivery and steganography was hypothesized and tested in those stages. 
Hunter’s hypothesis and following interpretations of results might differ from mine in his 
analysis. 
Constraints 
 When first planning out the project, Hunter and I assumed a massive array of tests with 
many variables. However, as we did research on the nature of the project, we determined that 
certain environmental factors, software availabilities, time constraints, pre-testing, and practical 
application narrowed down the necessity and ability to experiment with the multitude of 
independent variables originally designed. Part of this investigation was learning which tests 
were not feasible. If they were difficult and impractical for us to test, developers and hackers 
would likely avoid them also. Most importantly, we incorporated a lot of publicly available 
freeware that not only existentially reinforced our arguments, but also allowed us to move 
forward to an easily reproducible, practical proof of concept. 
  While our first test used an ultrasonic radio developed with GNU Radio, later tests 
utilized software called Minimodem, an audio modem built for Linux by Kamal Mostafa that 
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utilizes FSK (Mostafa, 2016). This imposed a few very relevant constraints on our test aside 
from the fact that it was the best available means for our test. FSK is a digital mode that strikes a 
reasonable balance between the slow, high fidelity modes like CW, and the fast, dynamic, but 
complex and fragile modes like QAM. Also, we can eliminate temporal modes such as PSK. The 
creator of the GNU Radio method we used for initial tinkering reinforces this determination as 
he also claims FSK is superior to PSK in his tests (Anfractuosity). Regarding time, taking more 
time to transmit a signal can provide for higher fidelity in theory, but the longer time also allows 
more time to collect interference. These factors are seriously dependent on the mode and 
environmental noise, though. Most importantly, in regards to practicality, Minimodem is open 
source, meaning the source code is public. An attacker building malware using this technology 
would most likely try to incorporate and augment already proven code into their programming 
rather that tediously “reinventing the wheel” for the same functionality. This allowed us to 
reasonably eliminate another independent variable. 
Because of the availability of testing software like Minimodem and GNU Radio on the 
Linux platform, most of our transmission tests were confined to Linux only. While it is important 
to consider other operating systems like Windows, especially when discussing malware, utilizing 
the concepts presented here on other systems is a matter of programming or “porting” software 
to those platforms in some way. This is a software development issue and is not within the scope 
of our tests. While some differences may be introduced by drivers and other audio processing 
software, the hardware can be considered a constant. 
As stated before, the use of stock hardware is important when considered from an 
information security perspective. We are testing the ability to use ultrasound for data 
transmission discretely; therefore, all testing device hardware was unmodified. It was acceptable 
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to use both cell phones and laptops as both are in common use as computing devices and 
containers of information assets. Another hardware affected independent variable we eliminated 
was loudness, as the amplitude capability varies among the different hardware and volume may 
be increased up until the point of audio distortion providing a theoretical boost to range, but that 
concept is not very relevant to our investigation. Four our tests, we used the maximum system 
volume on each device. This provides a pseudo constant, as the hardware on each device is 
different. 
Testing Narrative 
 Before trying our main proof concept, we conducted two informal experiments to test our 
ability to move forward with the main experiment. Using, GNU radio, an open source visual tool 
to construct software defined radios in Linux, and using the radio setup developed by 
Anfractuosity on Hunter’s laptop, he was able to transmit text via ultrasound (Anfractuosity). 
While we did not test the ability to receive and interpret the transmission back into text, we did 
test the ability to receive the signal on another device (verified by spectrum analyzer on a phone) 
across a crowded room in the Burruss building. Interestingly, the physical containment concept 
from previous sections was reinforced as the signal was not detected outside of the doorway. 
While we assumed MP3 compression would destroy an ultrasonic signal, I still tested that as well. 
Using the open source audio editing software Audacity, I tested the integrity of an ultrasound 
slow scan television signal after conversion to MP3 so that I could better visualize the effect of 
compression on it. The signal was reduced to mostly static. 
We began Minimodem tests with two laptops, both running Ubuntu Linux, a modern Dell 
Ultrabook (XPS 9340) as the receiver and an older Dell netbook (Latitude 2100) as the 
transmitter. We conducted these tests in the common area of a dorm. At first, we were testing 
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with the Badout character set that is traditionally used for Radio Teletype (RTTY). It provides 
greater speed due to its simplicity, but we realized a fundamental problem in that it was case 
insensitive when many device operating system commands and data formats are case sensitive, 
we soon witched to ASCII. We began testing different frequencies between 17kHz and 20kHz 
in .1kHz intervals and testing their ability to transmit data. As stated before, while slowing down 
the transmission rate, or baud, would, in initial theory, provide higher fidelity; it also allows 
more exposure to interference. We experimented with a few baud rates, but decided to stick with 
45 baud as it produced the best results over multiple tests. Coincidently, 45 baud is also the most 
common speed for amateur radio teletype (Radioteletype, 2016). We encountered sporadic 
problems when the laptop microphones and speakers were not pointed at each other, so we began 
testing sending text between the devices with their fronts facing each other, for the greatest 
stability in results, and moved them farther apart each test to get a maximum distance that we 
were reliably able to transmit text without error. We determined the best overall transmission 
parameters were 45 baud ASCII with a space frequency of 18.6kHz and a mark frequency of 
18.7kHz. This will be explained more in the next section. To start the transmitter at the command 
line, minimodem --tx -S 18600 -M 18700 45 --ascii was entered and text messages were sent 
afterwards by typing and pressing enter at the command line (receiving command will be 
demonstrated in the next paragraph).  
 Our selection of text to transfer between the laptops was arbitrary, but after we were able 
to determine the best workable parameters, we needed to test the ability to control the computer 
with ultrasonic commands. Therefore we chose the command cat etc/passwd, which returns the 
user accounts of the system. To receive the ultrasonic commands and pipe them to the command 
shell for execution the command  minimodem --rx -S 18600 -M 18700 45 --ascii -c 2.5 -q | sh 
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was used to start the listener on the Ultrabook. There are two new flags in this command. “-c” 
represents the “confidence threshold” or the minimum signal quality the program will accept. 
Basically, it acts as the squelch, but was not well documented beyond what we could ascertain. 
2.5 was high enough to reject most interference, but not reject the intended transmission. The “-q” 
flag removes metadata or debug output about the received signal so only the command is passed 
to the command shell. 
Finally, we needed to test the ability to use steganography. We chose Sandstorm by 
Darude as the innocuous carrier of the previous ultrasonic audio payload and the test of the 
resistance to interference when using the music to hide the signal. We knew from earlier tests 
that MP3 compression damages the ultrasonic signals, so, we combined the audio in Audacity by 
having it record the speaker output of the signal with the buffer spacing, imported the Sandstorm 
MP3, and exported it to a raw .WAV file for our tests. We tested the ability to send commands to 
a discretely listening computer and also took spectrograph images of the signal in different 
environments. 
After this, we wanted to collect some data about different environments beyond or initial 
proof of concept and provide some acoustical context about those environments while allowing 
visualization of their effect on the noise profile. To do this, we took the audio file from our 
previous test and the ultrasonic transmission without the music, and played them on my phone 
(Motorola XT926M) while collecting spectrograph images with a Spectrum Analyzer app on 
Hunter’s phone (OnePlus One). We took a screenshot of the background noise, playing of the 
ultrasonic signal, and then the signal and music combined in the dorm where our initial tests 
were conducted, outside of the dorm with traffic going by, a server room, and the KSU 
Commons. We also repeated our previous tests with the laptops. The last two, a server room and 
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a crowded area represent two environments where ultrasonic steganography usage or attacks 
might occur. The results are in the next section. 
Results and Examples 
 Most of our tests were conducted with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ possible conclusions until the final 
environmental tests with the spectrum analyzer. This project is approached from an information 
security perspective rather than a scientific one. Empirical data is not as important as the 
practical ability to produce a functioning proof of concept. Also, an abundance of empirical data 
is not as relevant to the overall question at had as, when dealing with acoustics, there are too 
many independent variables imposed by the changing environmental factors and the materials 
used with testing. However, the evidence presented here should provide a glimpse into the real-
world possibility of using ultrasonic transmission for data stenography. 
 From our tests in the dorm common area it was determined that the best transmission 
parameters using Minimodem, when considering the relevance to cyber security, was using the 
ASCII character set at 45 baud, FSK with a space frequency of 18.6kHz and mark frequency of 
18.7kHz. With the two laptops facing, were able to receive transmissions without error at a 
distance of up to 8 feet. These tests were repeated outside of the dorm by a busy road, in server 
room, and in the crowded KSU Commons. The observable difference was that the usable 
distance shrank to 6 feet outside and in the server room.  
 The following is an image of the receiving laptop trying to read a signal at 19.7kHz was 
one of our tests trying to pinpoint a good frequency. Notice the errors in receiving when the 
signal is closer to the observed ~20kHz usable limit when trying to receive. This displays the 
output of the Minimodem listener on the command line. 
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Below is a screenshot of the actual testing of steganography of the cat etc/passwd 
command with music. In the background is the Audacity window, where the sounds where 
combined into a .WAV file, with the stereo waveform of Sandstorm showing. In the left 
command shell window, multiple commands for clearing the command shell to the right and 
testing adding buffer spaces to command can be seen in the Minimodem listener output. In the 
right shell window, the ultrasonic command has been piped to the shell thus directing the 
operating system to parse the etc/passwd file showing the user accounts. For this test, we 
transmitted from Hunter’s laptop’s speakers to his laptop’s microphones, from my laptop’s 
speakers to his laptop’s microphone, and from my phone to his laptop’s speakers. All tests were 
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successful.
 
 The following images are the spectrograph tests discussed at the end of the Testing 
Narrative section. Observe the listed peak value of approximately 18.6kHz and the two pronged 
appearance of the peak showing the separation of the space and mark frequency. To the left of 
the ultrasonic signal, environmental noise and music can be seen in the spectrograph. For this 
spectrograph, the X axis is frequency in Hz and the Y axis is decibels. Ignore the red values. 
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Dorm Noise Floor (LEFT) and Dorm + Ultrasonic Signal (RIGHT) 
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Dorm + Ultrasonic Signal + Music 
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Outdoor Noise Floor (LEFT) and Outdoor + Ultrasonic Signal (RIGHT) 
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Outdoor + Ultrasonic Signal + Music 
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Server Room Noise Floor (LEFT) and Server Room + Ultrasonic Signal (RIGHT) 
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Server Room + Ultrasonic Signal + Music 
 
Ultrasonic Data Steganography                                                                          Alexander Edwards 
33 
 
Commons Noise Floor (LEFT) and Commons + Ultrasonic Signal (RIGHT) 
 z      
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Commons + Ultrasonic Signal + Music 
 
 
Interpretations 
The frequencies we chose within 18kHz can be considered arbitrary due to a multitude of 
environmental factors effecting out tests, but we did have important practical conclusions. Lower 
frequencies, like those in the 17kHz range may be easier to produce by stock device hardware, 
but they are slightly within audible range and also closer in frequency to interference produced 
by humans. Higher frequencies, like those above 19kHz are not handled well by device hardware 
and often leads to distortion, chirping, and buzzing in speakers resulting in severe loss of fidelity. 
Most hardware can handle up to 20kHz transmission before the signal is unusable; however, we 
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do not know how drivers and other audio software effects this.  Ultrasonic frequencies 
sometimes produce a loud pop when they first are transmitted on certain hardware, most likely 
due to an electrical surge in the speaker. It may be necessary to place buffer characters that can 
accept interference for the pop before the payload of a transmission. Placing spaces as a buffer 
before the cat etc/passwd command remedied this problem as spaces do not affect the parsing of 
the command by the command shell. While we could have experimented with baud rate further, 
the usable baud rate was roughly a function of distance + environmental factors + character set. 
There may be some benefit from choosing a baud rate divisible bits per character (which is 8 for 
ASCII), but this wasn’t tested.  
As stated, data was receivable up to 8 feet at maximum hardware volume in the dorm and 
Commons with the observable difference being that distance shrank to 6 feet outside and in the 
server room. My project partner, Hunter Young, might differ on these measurements as "usable 
distance" is subjective. The range can be extended with random losses to fidelity. We believe this 
is due to mechanical noise from cars and server fans, but also air temperature and movement 
from these factors might also have an effect.  From our earlier tests we determined that while 
obstacles in the way of a transmission, like people and servers, may not affect the ability to 
receive a signal, the geometry of a room can. Reception of signals, at least on a spectrograph, in 
their entirety is virtually impossible outside of a room unless directly in a doorway. Receiving 
transmissions were extremely difficult when the speakers and microphones were not facing. This 
may also be affected by the position of the hardware in the device. Therefore, the ultrasonic 
signals are negligibly affected by obstacles, but are unable to reflect and diffract well. 
Meshnetting as described in earlier sections might overcome this limit. 
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Practical Conclusions 
 From these tests and with reinforcement by a few other researchers, it can be concluded 
that, while the concept and technology are in their infancy, the ability to transmit data 
ultrasonically between common consumer computers with their stock hardware is not only 
feasible but constitutes a form of steganography relevant to the study of information security. 
However, due to the fragility and low speed of the transmission, the amount of data practically 
transferable is strictly limited reducing the “data” transferable to simple strings of characters 
rather than entire information assets. Also, multiple sources along in our research have shown 
distance to be a major limiting factor. This means that it may not be practical for infiltration 
other than simple commands for mobile device management and targeting for malware or 
exfiltration of confidential material beyond keylogging or passwords. This does not mean 
corporations and governments capable of devoting massive resources cannot improve on this 
concept technologically. 
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Practical Applications 
Suggestions 
When utilizing this concept and developing software for it, during selection of 
transmission parameters and use case of the software, it is imperative to consider the 
environment where the software is intended to be used. This may not always be possible, so 
reproduction and expansion of our tests may be prudent for long term development. The tests 
performed for this project may be some use; the need for buffer characters to mitigate speaker 
pop is a good example. In fact, this may mean that any applications of it must be very 
specifically targeted. This may limit the malware feasibility of ultrasonic data transmission to 
specific, contained attacks mostly likely as a cyber warfare weapon between nation-states against 
particular facilities. 
As observed, while it can provide data steganography, the concept of ultrasonic data 
transmission is extremely fragile. However, while it may greatly slow down the transmission 
time, it may be possible to ensure fidelity without longer exposure to interference through the use 
of repetition and checking. The same transmission can be repeated several times and software 
could be written to compare the transmissions, and select the characters that were interpreted 
most often at each matching point in time across the matching signals to derive a “correct” string. 
An XOR checksum or a word or character count may also be transmitted at the end of each 
message for error correction. Longer checksums may be susceptible to inference themselves. If 
two way transmission is intended, error correction can be further aided by asking the recipient 
device for an “ok,”, “repeat,” or “verify” reply. 
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Substitution commands and simpler character sets, like baudot, may be used to reduce 
signal complexity and transmission time. For example, to instruct software to complete a task, a 
two character symbol may be transmitted, in a shorter amount of time than an actual full 
command recognized by a host system, to software that already has the command stored and is 
listening for the execution prompt. There are caveats to this, though. Baudot, for example, is case 
insensitive and may have issues with interpretation by operating systems with case sensitive file 
systems. Using symbols requires the functional payload to already be stored on a on the 
receiving system in the listening software. This makes the listener less discrete and susceptible to 
heuristic detection if it is malware. 
If exploration into this concept advances to the point where robust protocols can be used, 
similar or identical to traditional computer networking protocols, the ability to send robust data 
packets may be possible with enough error checking. Two of the earlier sources were able to 
develop crude means of transmitting datagrams rather than the raw ASCII text that we were 
testing with. While also relevant to information security and computer networking, we did not 
test encryption due to the observed fragility of the data transmission. It is concluded that if 
encryption is used, it should be done at the character level, not the binary level to preserve data 
fidelity. Errors at the bit level errors could render entire messages unreadable. 
Possible Theoretical Scenarios 
The Fraunhofer FKIE study, while using a proprietary protocol stack, demonstrated the 
concept of ultrasonic data transmission utilizing a meshnet that enhanced its usefulness 
(Hanspach & Goetz, 2014). The BadBIOS scenario, whether a hoax or not, presented the idea of 
discrete malware collaboration outside of the conventional network vectors thus potentially 
allowing the formation of local botnets of airgapped systems (Goodin, 2013). If malware can be 
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propagated to multiple systems in a close proximity, such as with the infected USB drive 
suggested in BadBIOS, their effect could be amplified. As discussed earlier, the ability to have 
malware on hosts avoid detection by being only a listener could act an information security time 
bomb. If the listening malware is distributed densely enough, command payloads, in the form of 
ultrasonic digital signals could “arm” the malware by many means including, but not limited to 
shared music, videos, a passerby’s phone, or playing over an intercom. Also the attack could be 
designed where only one host had to receive an audio payload, and, using stock microphones, 
and speakers could transmit commands to all other listening hosts. 
Also building on an idea from the Fraunhofer FKIE study, very small scale data 
exfiltration can be an achieved, such as with the keylogger example. While transmitting 
keystrokes discretely and acoustically may not provide much benefit over traditional keyloggers, 
it could be used as a means of exfiltration when all traditional data connections are severed 
(Hanspach & Goetz, 2014). There is also a well-known surveillance tactic using lasers to 
eavesdrop on distant conversation. Laser light is pointed at a surface that will vibrate as it 
absorbs local sound waves and the changes in the reflected beam are processed into sound from 
far way. Perhaps this technology could be adapted to function with digital ultrasound.  If a target 
organization was to restrict network access by policy or by advanced security controls such as 
metal shielding to contain radio waves from WiFi. An infected system or systems could transmit 
data ultrasonically and vibrate a window, for example, and keystrokes can be received from a 
laser microphone far outside the security perimeter. 
Powerline Ethernet, a means of modulating the electrical current in a building with 
special wall warts to send network traffic, is a common consumer solution. There are also 
powerline audio adapters to eliminate the need to run new cabling for sound as well. While the 
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use of powerline network adapters is common, powerline audio is less so and therefore might 
appear to be ordinary electrical noise if it were used discretely in a building. If the technology 
can carry ultrasound, it might be a means of overcoming the physical barriers that prevent the 
propagation of ultrasound and even the physical barriers of a security perimeter given that the 
carrying electrical lines cross that barrier. 
There are also less malicious and also less security relevant usage scenarios for discrete 
ultrasonic data transmission. Mobile Device Management could utilize the technology for offline 
communication between peer devices or for the detection of nearby devices. The natural physical 
containment of ultrasound could allow better control of local peer to peer networks. Also, as 
demonstrated by SilverPush, it may be used to support and analyze marketing among device 
users. 
Security Controls 
There are obvious security controls, such is including all known ultrasonic 
communication software (like the software referenced in this project) in anti-malware definitions 
and having heurist analysis detect any software that functions similarly. This is impractical as it 
may require repetitive whitelisting of drivers and other audio software. The Fraunhofer FKIE 
study proposes and idea of an intrusion detection system (IDS) sensitive to ultrasonic attacks. 
They suggest analysis of audio input and output and any modulations present in the audio to 
detect signals that might carry data (Hanspach & Goetz, 2014). My project partner and I suggest 
another, cruder countermeasure: jamming. While it is a federal crime in the US to jam WiFi, 
Bluetooth, and other radio bands, sound, especially inaudible sound, is virtually unregulated. A 
quick search on Amazon.com reveals that tweeters, speakers designed for high pitched sounds, in 
the many hundreds of watts are inexpensive (Pyramid TW36 7-Inch x 3-Inch 400 Watts Wide 
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Dispersion Horn Tweeter). This would allow the cheap creation of large ultrasonic deadzones, 
should attacks via ultrasonic data steganography become a significant threat. The only caveat 
with jamming in this range is potential irritation to animals and people with acute hearing. 
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